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Although no landmark decisions in the area of tort law were handed
down during the course of the year under review, nor may it be said that
great questions were passed upon, yet there always seem to be new applica-
tions of settled principles of law which provide students of the law with
ever-challenging interest. As our relationships in an ever-changing society
continue to grow more complex, new claims arising out of situations differ-
ing slightly from those found in past cases will continue to provide
law and lawyers with a challenge in directing our society toward its goal.
As well settled as we thought the law to be as it pertains to the liability
of a possessor of land, for instance, even here we find new problems pre-
sented, and the well-settled principles take on new lustre, and perhaps new
meaning. As one of our great American jurists once observed, new appli-
cations to new situations may "have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue
of the law."1
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of Persons in Certain Relations
1. Possessors of Land
The adjustment between two great policies in the law is seen in work-
ing out principles of liability where a child trespasser suffers injuries on
the land of a possessor. The one policy is to promote the development of
land and the freedom of private enterprise by encouraging the possessor
to make a beneficial use of the land; the other is the social interest in chil-
dren, although they are trespassers on private property and not infrequently
may be injured. The attractive nuisance doctrine is perhaps the most de-
veloped effort in adjusting these two policies.
*This article contains a discussion of selected decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court which appear in Volumes 346 to 356, inclusive, of the South Western Re-
porter, Second Series.
"Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 269 (1920).
(578)
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There is another rule, independent of the factual situations of the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine, which, as to children of immature judgment,
iequires the possessor to exercise care in using or maintaining extremely
dangerous substances, irrespective of the fact that the children's status is
that of trespassers. The court en banc, in Paisley v. Liebowits,2 applied the
dangerous substance exception to a new type of danger. The previous Mis-
souri decisions had applied this exception to highly dangerous explosives
which might be found by trespassing children. In the instant case, the de-
fendant was a building contractor and was engaged in constructing apart-
ments in St. Louis. In the late afternoon of the day of the injury, the
infant plaintiff, then seven years old, came upon the premises and was play-
ing around the smoldering remains of a fire started for the purpose of burn-
ing trash or waste materials created by the construction. The fire was some
thirty to fifty feet from the sidewalk. Here the child discovered a can con-
taining some liquid and accidentally knocked it over, spilling some of the
contents onto the remains of the fire. The can contained oleum spirits, which
the painters used at the close of work each day to clean paint brushes. An ex-
pert witness testified that oleum spirits is a volatile type of liquid vapor
which will flash and burn when thoroughly vaporized, and explode if con-
fined; that it is somewhere between gasoline and kerosene in volatility. The
court held that oleum spirits was a sufficiently dangerous substance to bring
the case within the dangerous substance exception to the rule of nonliabil-
ity to children trespassers, and that whether such conduct constituted neg-
ligence was properly for the jury.
A possessor of land who creates or maintains thereon an artificial con-
dition so near to an existing highway that he should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk to others traveling upon the highway or foreseeably
deviating from it in the ordinary course of travel, is subject to liability. This
is sometimes referred to as the "hard by" rule. In Winegardner V. City of
St. Louis," the parents of a 16 year old son brought an action for the al-
leged wrongful death of their son, on the theory that a possessor of land
abutting upon a public highway is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to children by an excavation or other artificial condition maintained by him
thereon, so close to the highway that it involves an unreasonable risk be-
cause of a child's tendency to deviate from the highway. The court affirmed
2. 347 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
3. 346 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1961).
1962]
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the dismissal of the action since this was not a deviation situation. Here
the boy had departed from the road, traveled a path on private property
a certain distance to the quarry maintained by the defendant, and thereafter
had entered the water in the quarry.
In Gruetzemacker v. Billings,4 the plaintiff had entered defendants' prem-
ises to rescue a three year old child whose foot was caught on top of a fence
and who was screaming to be helped. As plaintiff attempted to return to
her adjoining premises by passing through the defendants' flower bed, she
tripped over a stake which the defendants had placed there to protect flowers.
Her cause of action was based on the theory that, in entering the premises
of the defendants to rescue a child who was playing with the defendants'
children, she occupied the status of invitee. This presented a question as
to the status of one who enters the premises of another to rescue one in
peril. The plaintiff did not contend that she was on the premises for the
business benefit of the possessors. Verdict and judgment were for the plain-
tiff, but the trial court, on defendants' motion, set aside the verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff and entered judgment for the defendants. On ap-
peal, this action was affirmed. The appellate court did not have to pass
upon the status of the rescuer, but based the decision on the ground that,
even if the plaintiff occupied the status of an invitee when she entered, she
did not occupy that status at the time she was returning to her own lot by
undertaking to walk through the defendants' flower bed. Only a few feet
further she could have crossed on the lawn area. The court found no evidence
which tended to show that the area used as a flower bed was ever intended
for use as a walkway or passageway between the two buildings. In return-
ing to her own property, she could not reasonably be expected to walk
through the flower bed, when better and safer ways were easily available.
At that time her status as to existing conditions on the premises was no
greater than that of a licensee; hence the defendants owed no duty to make
safe or to warn of the danger of tripping over the stake.
Although the injuries were sustained in Arkansas, no Arkansas case
was cited or found involving the liability of a possessor to an adult tres-
passer, where the employees of a railroad, with actual knowledge of the
presence of the plaintiff trespasser, injured him by an affirmative act of
negligence involving the use of an inherently dangerous explosive. The Mis-
4. 348 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1961).
[Vol. 27
3
McCleary: McCleary: Torts in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
TORTS IN MISSOURI
souri court, in Stevens v. Missouri Pac. R.R., ' instead applied its own prec-
edents and affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff trespasser. The railroad em-
ployees had found some dynamite caps among trash which they were burn-
ing. Plaintiff had been standing nearby and his presence was known to
the employees engaged in the burning. The court held that where a pos-
sessor maintains and handles extremely dangerous explosives, a duty to
exercise reasonable care exists, irrespective of the fact that the status of the
person may be that of a trespasser. This exception to the rule of nonliability
to trespassers "is fully applicable to adult trespassers where the activity
which a possessor of land carries on upon the land is such that unless care-
fully carried on it is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, and he
has actual knowledge that a trespasser is on the premises at some point made
dangerous by the conduct of the activity.",,
2. Automobiles
The dilemma of a motorist whose automobile had skidded, while still
daylight, on icy pavement and had come to rest blocking most of one lane,
was presented in Eastman v. Brackma n There is a duty not to obstruct
the traveled portion of a highway with one's car, which means that if
one does so he has a duty to remove it as promptly as reasonably possible.
At the same time, there is a duty to warn approaching motorists of the
hazard which has been created on the traveled portion of the highway. A
motorist cannot do both, and a question may arise as to which duty is to
be performed first. In the instant case the plaintiff contended that the
defendant, after slipping from the pavement, knew she was helplessly bogged
down, and that she should have abandoned the car and gone immediately
to the top of the hill to warn oncoming drivers of the danger below. The
defendant knew she needed traction to move her car and believed she had
the means to supply it in the form of wire mesh skid pads designed to give
traction to automobiles on icy surfaces. In addition, she had a sack of sand,
and was attempting to get it from the trunk of the car when an approach-
ing motor vehicle, seeking to stop, also skidded on the ice, causing it to
collide with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger and which had
stopped to render assistance to defendant. It was not contended that the
defendant was negligent in permitting her car to slide from the pavement.
5. 355 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1962).
6. Id. at 129.
7. 347 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
1962]
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Under all the circumstances-the fact that it was still daylight and the
range of visibility was reasonably good, that the average grade for a distance
of 200 feet from the crown of the hill was a little over four per cent, that
the defendant believed that she had the means with her to obtain the
needed traction in order to move her car, and that she lacked warning de-
vices to place on the highway-the court en banc found that she was exer-
cising diligence in doing all that could reasonably be expected. A judgment
for the defendant was affirmed.
One who acts, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject
to the duty of acting with reasonable care as to foreseeable risks. Thus a
driver of a motor vehicle who gratuitously undertakes to signal the driver
of another motor vehicle may be liable for the consequences if in giving
the signal he does not exercise the highest degree of care. This standard of
conduct was applied in Miller v. Watkins,s an action against the driver of
a school bus for the wrongful death of a seven or eight year old boy who
dashed into the street and was struck by a truck as the latter was passing
the school bus. The bus was stopping to pick up the boy, who was running
toward the highway to board the bus. The defendant knew that the boy on
previous occasions had run out into the highway to board the bus without
looking for traffic, but did not see the boy on this occasion. The boy's view
of traffic approaching from the direction of the truck was partially obstructed
by a car in a driveway parked eight to twelve feet from the pavement, and
by four mailboxes three, or four feet from the edge of the pavement. The
driver of the school bus had come to a stop with his lights flashing but
had not lowered the cross arm stop sign. After observing the approach of
the truck, when the two vehicles were 175 feet apart, the defendant bus
8. 355 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962). The judgment for the defendant in the trial
court was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial due to a burden of proof
instruction which required proof of negligence to a reasonable degree of certainty:
The Court instructs the jury that in considering the evidence in this case as
to whether any defendant was guilty of negligence as defined and submitted
in these instructions, you are not at liberty to resort to guesswork, specu-
lation or conjecture, but you must be governed by all the facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence and the instructions of the Court, and if, under
the evidence and the instructions of the Court, you are -unable to determine
wit& any reasonable degree of certainty whvether a certain defendant was
guilty of negligence as defined and submitted in these instructions, then
the plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover against said defendants and
your verdict must be in favor of that defendant; and in this connection, the
Court instructs you that under no circumstances are you to be swayed or
influenced by bias, prejudice or sympathy, for or against any party to this
action. (Criticized portion italicized by the court.)
[Vol. 27
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driver made a gesture with his hand, motioning the driver of the approaching
truck, who was slowing down, "to come on through." He motioned twice
more when the vehicles were 150 feet apart, and the driver of the truck
proceeded to go on through, accelerating his speed slightly. The driver of the
truck did not observe the boy running straight toward the highway, "as
fast as he could," until it was too late to prevent the boy from crashing into
the side of the truck. The truck driver's -view had also been obstructed by
the parked car and the row of mailboxes. It was held that the jury could
reasonably find that signaling and waving the truck driver through under
these circumstances involved a foreseeable risk to the boy, which the driver
of the school bus would not have taken in the exercise of the highest degree
of care.
Although the automobile cases based on a theory of negligence con-
tinue to constitute a large share of the torts cases before the court in the
period under review, few new questions of liability were presented. The ap-
peals were usually predicated on alleged errors in instructions, which cannot
be treated adequately in a limited survey of this nature.
3. Carriers
In Hatvm v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Lois,9 an action was brought
under the Safety Applicance Act for injuries sustained by a plaintiff who
fell from defendant's boxcar when it collided with another car on an indus-
trial siding as the result of an inefficient handbrake. Whether the defend-
ant was liable under the act turned on whether the boxcar was being used
on the defendant's line at the time of the injury. The track where the acci-
dent occurred was on land owned by an industry, but the railroad company
had been granted the exclusive right to enter on the land for the purpose of
constructing, maintaining, and operating over the tracks located there. The
railroad owned the ties and rails and, under the agreement with the industry
served, had the duty to maintain the track. Under this agreement the in-
dustry's employees moved boxcars on the track for the purpose of unload-
ing. Plaintiff was an employee of the industry. It was held that the track
did not cease to be an integral part of the defendant's line simply because
the industry's employees moved the cars for the purpose of unloading; in
moving the cars to and from the unloading point on the defendant's track,
the employees only assisted the defendant in the movement of cars on its
9. 355 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1962).
1962]
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line. The court distinguished the case from those where an industry's em-
ployee was injured while moving railroad cars on tracks owned by the in-
dustry, in which the court treated the system of tracks on the industry's
property as though it constituted a private railroad system. Judgment for
the plaintiff was affirmed.
4. Municipal Corporations
Under the law of Missouri it is the duty of a city to exercise ordinary
care to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel. The city is
also liable for torts arising out of acts of its employees engaged in maintain-
ing or repairing the streets to make them reasonably safe for travel. In
Myers v. City of Palmyra,10 the action was for injuries sustained by a
pedestrian when he was struck by a city-owned tractor which was being
operated by employees of the city to remove accumulations of snow from the
streets to make them passable for traffic. The defendant sought to classify
this activity as a governmental function so that the doctrine of immunity for
torts would apply, based on Missouri decisions which hold that the cleaning
of streets by a municipality is for the protection and preservation of health
-in the instant case by enabling the sick to get medical assistance and
provisions necessary to preserve health. The trial court dismissed the peti-
tion and entered summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal by the
plaintiff, it was held that "the removal by a municipality of accumulations
of snow from its streets, when not done primarily for purposes of sanitation
and the health of the community, constitutes a maintenance of the streets
in furtherance of the general duty of a city to maintain its streets in a
reasonably safe condition for travel."" Thus the immunity doctrine was not
applicable. "The fact that from the activity of removing snow to make the
streets passable there may be an incidental benefit to the health of the
community is not controlling.' 12
5. Electricity
Suppliers of electricity are held to exercise the highest degree of care
to keep their wires in such condition as to prevent injury to others who
lawfully may be in close proximity to those wires. Whether the defendant,
in the exercise of the highest degree of care, should reasonably have an-
10. 355 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1962).
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 19.
[Vol 27
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ticipated that someone lawfully in the area was likely to be injured as a
result of contact with high-voltage wires, was presented in Erbes v. Union
Elec. Co 3 and Carey v. Crawford Elec. Co-op., Im.14 In the former case
it was held that the plaintiff made a submissible case for injuries sustained
when a cable he was holding came in contact with the defendant's unin-
sulated, overhead transmission line. The cable was attached to a crane which
was being used on a construction project. The evidence made a jury ques-
tion as to whether the defendant electric company, in the exercise of the
highest degree of care, should have foreseen a reasonable likelihood that
some persons engaged in constructing a building would be injured as a re-
sult of the nature and location of its power line. The judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed. On the other hand, in the latter decision, under
appropriate instructions for the defendant, the jury found that two wires,
carrying high voltage electric current and extending twenty-two and twenty-
six feet above the ground, were constructed at such height that the defend-
ant, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, could not reasonably have
anticipated that plaintiff's decedent would come in contact with the wires
when he was assisting in the installation of a roof television antenna system
on a farm home.
6. Imputed Negligence
All joint adventurers are liable for personal injuries suffered by others
as a result of negligence in the maintenance of premises, including instances
in which the actual negligence is that of some, but not all, members of the
joint adventure. In Pigg v. Bridges,5 the question was whether an insurance
group and its district agent had engaged in a joint adventure while conduct-
ing a formal opening of a district office, in determining liability to an in-
vitee at the reception for injuries sustained when the invitee fell down the
cellar stairway. The contractual undertaking between the insurance group
and its district agent expressly provided that "Nothing contained herein is
intended or shall be construed to create the relationship of employer and
employee."', However, this was held not to be decisive of the relationship
in the staging of the formal opening of the district office. A representative of
the insurance group had inspected and had approved the office selected by
13. 353 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1962).
14. 347 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1961).
15. 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
16. Id. at 31.
19621
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the district agent. He had also advised the district agent that the insurance
group had a regular form of advertisement, publicizing the formal opening
and inviting the public to attend, which was usually placed in the newspa-
pers. This advertisement was run in a local paper and the cost was divided
between the insurance group and the district agent. In various places in
the advertisement the names of both appeared. In extra large block letters
above a plate-glass window of the building were the words "Farmers In-
surance Group." This and a sign hanging above the door in the form of
the official insignia of the group were suggested or furnished by the group.
The court en banc found, on appeal, that the evidence would support a
finding of joint adventure between the insurance group and the district
agent in conducting the formal opening of the district office, and that the
general public was invited there primarily to induce the public to do busi-
ness with the insurance group, through the district agent, under policies
issued by the group. The planning, advertising, participating in, and shar-
ing of the expense of the formal opening of the district office was held to war-
rant a finding that the defendants were active participants as joint adven-
turers in carrying it out for the profit of both, thus making those attending
the opening invitees of both parties."'
The question in Hume v. Crane"s was whether the petition stated a
cause of action by one of the occupants of a car against the owner, who
was riding in the front seat beside the alleged negligent driver, where all
of the occupants were on a joint enterprise. The driver at the time of the
accident was the husband of the plaintiff. The accident occurred in New
Mexico, where the law provides that a wife does not have a cause of action
against her husband for personal injuries sustained during coverture through
his negligence. Therefore, under New Mexico law, plaintiff's earlier action
for damages against the administrator of her husband's estate failed. The
present action against the son-in-law, the owner of the car, who was riding
17. When the appeal was in division one, the case was submitted under the
doctrine of respondeat superior but the plaintiff did not brief his contention that
the case was submissible on the theory of joint adventure. In division one thejudges were unable to agree on the precise legal relationship between the insurance
group and the district agent. The court en banc, in affirming the trial court's order
granting the plaintiff a new trial, held that the plaintiff was not precluded from
amending his petition so as to try his case upon the theory of joint adventure,
which under the evidence made a submissible case; and "that upon transfer to the
court en banc plaintiff, as respondent, under the circumstances here shown had
the right to brief defendants' liability under the latter theory and to seek remand
for trial upon that theory." Id. at 34.
18. 352 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1962).
[Vol. 27
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in the front seat with his father-in-law when the automobile left the pave-
ment and overturned, was predicated on the theory of imputed negligence
of the driver to the defendant. It was held that the doctrine of imputed
negligence did not apply as between the parties to a joint enterprise. To do
so would permit one member of a joint enterprise to charge another member,
who was without fault, with the negligence of a third member of the enter-
prise. Here the -negligence of the driver, if imputed to the owner of the
car, should by the same reasoning be likewise chargeable to the plaintiff,
who was also a member of the joint enterprise.
7. Humanitarian Negligence
The decisions predicated on the humanitarian doctrine are not in-
cluded in this survey, but will be covered separately in a subsequent issue
of the Review.
B. Re: Ipsa Loquitur
Two 1962 decisions, when studied together, contain an instructive anal-
ysis of the question of whether the plaintiff may go to the jury on the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, although his evidence tends to show the specific
cause of the accident. That is, by introducing evidence tending to show
the specific acts of negligence, is the plaintiff held to have abandoned the
inference of negligence which arises in a res ipsa loquitur situation?
In Hornberger v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 9 defendant's bus, on which
the plaintiff was a passenger, collided with a private vehicle. She submitted
her case on res ipsa loquitur against the company and on specific negligence
against the operator of the private vehicle. Under Missouri law, the pas-
senger in this situation is given the benefit of the doctrine in making out a
prima facie case of negligence against the carrier, even though the defend-
ant is not in sole control and management of the agencies involved. As
a part of her case she used the admissions of the operator of the private
vehicle. The carrier contended that these admissions repelled any inference
of negligence on the part of the bus operator or, at least, showed a situation
justifying a reasonable inference that the accident was due to a cause other
than its negligence. This evidence showed that the private vehicle involved
had crossed the center line prior to the collision and was on the wrong
side of the street at the time of the impact. The court recognized that
19. 353 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1962).
19621
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
plaintiff's evidence might have supported either an inference that the pri-
vate vehicle skidded onto the wrong side of the street due to ice, or that
it was there due to negligent operation by the driver of the car. However,
this evidence was not thought to have been developed to the point where
it proved conclusively that the driver of the bus was at all times in the
exercise of the highest degree of care, It was pointed out that this evidence
did not show the location of the bus at the time the private vehicle crossed
the center line, the relative positions of the two vehicles at the time of the
collision, whether the private vehicle was stopped prior to the impact, the
speed of the bus as it approached, or the traffic conditions. Thus, plaintiff's
evidence did not repel a reasonable inference of the operator's concurring
or contributing negligence, and did not preclude the plaintiff from submit-
ting her case against the carrier on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
The same problem was before the court in Stevens v. Missouri Pac.
R.R.,2 where the plaintiff received injuries on the defendant's premises
when refuse of a bunk car was thrown into a fire near where plaintiff was
standing, resulting in an explosion. His evidence showed facts and circum-
stances from which the jury could infer specific negligence on the part of
defendant's employees. The court pointed out that an inference could be
drawn that someone had negligently left dynamite caps in the material
burned, and that the employees were negligent in not warning the plaintiff,
or in not inspecting the refuse before removing it from the bunk car, or in
throwing it on the fire without inspecting it, when they should have
known or suspected that it contained explosives. But this did not indicate
the specific act of negligence, although it may have tended to show the
specific cause of the accident. The specific act of negligence was still un-
certain, for the evidence did not
clearly etch and outline the precise and specific act of negligence
that caused plaintiff's injuries, as to exclude all doubt as to the
true cause of the occurrence. Plaintiff's proof did not show precisely
where the dynamite caps came from, or that they came out of the
bunk car, or by whom they were handled, or that they were in old
clothing, shoes or containers thrown onto the fire, or that they
were thrown onto the fire.21
It was observed that these caps may have been lying on the ground before
the fire was started. After plaintiff's evidence was in, the issue was still
20. Supra note 5.
21. Id. at 130.
[Vol. 27
11
McCleary: McCleary: Torts in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
TORTS IN MISSOURI
in doubt as to where the caps came from, and therefore plaintiff was
entitled to go to the jury on the res ipsa doctrine.
C. Defenses in Negligence Cases
The application of well-settled principles of defense in negligence cases
was found in a few fact situations of interest. In Gitterman v. Danell, 22
the owner of a furniture store had made arrangements to have the defend-
ants spray the store periodically for the purpose of exterminating vermin
and insects. At the time of the arrangements she had specifically inquired
whether the spraying would be dangerous to people in the store and was
assured by a representative of the exterminators that it would not. While
seated in one of the rooms of the store watching television, she saw a
man spraying other rooms, could smell the spray, and knew the purpose
of the spraying. When the exterminators reached the room in which she was
sitting, she was not requested to leave or change her position; hence she
remained seated while the spraying continued for about fifteen minutes.
She remained seated for thirty minutes to an hour after the spraying of
this room was completed, when she became nauseated and otherwise ill.
She was taken to the hospital, where she remained for over two months.
After verdict by the jury for the defendants, the trial court awarded plain-
tiff a new trial, which was affirmed on appeal, on the ground that an in-
struction which authorized a finding for the defendants if the jury found
that the plaintiff, by continuing to sit in the room during spraying, failed
to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, was fatally defective in
failing to require the further finding that plaintiff knew or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known that to remain seated under such cir-
cumstances would likely cause some injury to her.
The duty of a motorist contemplating the making of a left turn was
before the court in Myers v. Searcy.28 Plaintiff's action was for injuries
sustained when an overtaking automobile driven by the defendant collided
with the automobile driven by the plaintiff, as the latter was making a
left turn at a street intersection. Defendant's car was second in line behind
plaintiff's car and had pulled out to the left to pass the other two cars.
There was evidence that defendant's automobile was already on the left
side of the street and about fifty feet to the rear when plaintiff started
22. 356 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1962).
23. 356 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1962).
19621
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his left turn. By that time defendant was unable to stop his car before it
collided with the left door of plaintiff's automobile. On appeal from an
order of the trial court sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the
ground that error had been committed in giving defendant's instruction,
the court observed that the questioned instruction was somewhat unusual
and that no case had been found in which a similar instruction had been
given. It read as follows:
The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of plaintiff
to exercise the highest degree of care to keep a lookout to avoid
turning into the path of other vehicles being operated on 63rd
Street. Therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence that
the plaintiff saw or by the exercise of the highest degree of care
could have seen defendant's automobile approaching and passing,
if so, in time to have stopped his automobile and thereby have
avoided the collision, if so, but that plaintiff negligently failed so
to do and if such negligence directly caused or directly contributed
to cause the collision, if so, then your verdict must be for the
defendant.21
In finding that the instruction was not prejudicially erroneous, the
court held that a motorist intending to make a left turn at an intersection
is under a duty to keep a lookout for oncoming vehicles and also for
vehicles which may be following him, and that this duty exists even if
the driver of the overtaking vehicle is attempting to pass within 100 feet
of the intersection, in violation of a statute.
II. PossEssoRs OF AnALs
Infrequently do cases involving liability for personal injuries from
animals reach the highest court. Two recent decisions indicate, however,
that strict liability applies against the possessor of domestic animals for
injuries caused to others, where the possessor knew of the propensity of
the domestic animal to harm. In each case the plaintiff recovered a very
substantial verdict for damages. In Danrsker v. Gelb,25 plaintiff's injuries
were sustained when she, a social guest, was caused to step backwards to
the edge of the basement stairs and to fall down the stairs, when defend-
ant's large dog raised up on his hind legs and lunged at the plaintiff.
There was no evidence that the dog touched plaintiff. There was ev-
24. Id. at 62.
25. 352 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. 1961).
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idence that prior to the occasion in question the dog had lunged at a
neighbor, who injured his back in jumping to avoid the dog, and that
garbage men were afraid of the dog. It was held that the defendant's ev-
idence showed that she possessed knowledge of the viciousness of the dog,
and that "whether the dog lunged or jumped at people out of anger
or viciousness or out of playfulness is immaterial so long as the defendant
had knowledge of the fact that the dog had a tendency through its actions
to injure persons. ''26
Humes v. Salerno27 was an action for injures sustained by the plaintiff
when he was bitten by defendant's race horse while exercising the horse
for the defendant. The evidence was held to sustain the finding by the
jury that the horse was vicious and that the defendant knew of its pro-
pensity to injure persons.
III. RELEASES
The question in Spencer v. Bradley28 was whether the execution of a
partial release to parties named therein also constituted an appropriation
by a widower of the entire cause of action for his wife's wrongful death,
not only as to the alleged tort-feasors named in the release, but also as
to all other persons who might be properly charged with the alleged
wrongful death. The action was brought by the minor children for the
wrongful death of their mother, alleging that their father, as the surviving
spouse of the deceased, did not, by executing a partial release to some, but
not to all, the alleged tortfeasors who were responsible for his wife's death,
appropriate or extinguish the balance of the claim against a tortfeasor not
included in the release. Because a right of action was specifically reserved
against the defendant, it was contended that the unused right of action
under the Missouri Death Act vested in the deceased's minor children after
the surviving spouse's period for bringing his action had expired, and that
each wrongdoer was liable to each proper party, in his turn, for the whole
period of the act's statute of limitations, unless effectively released by suit
or other appropriate means. The defendant's position was that the act
provides for a single right of recovery for death; that during the first six
months following the death of the wife and mother this right of recovery
26. Id. at 16.
27. 351 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1961).
28. 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961).
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was vested exclusively in her surviving husband; that during this period
the husband appropriated this right of recovery by executing the partial
release to persons named in the release; that having so appropriated the
right of recovery during such period, he appropriated the right as against
any and all other tortfeasors; and, therefore, that no right of recovery
passed to the children at the end of the six months' period. In affirming,
cn appeal, the action of the trial court which had sustained defendant's
motion to dismiss the petition, the court held that the right of action
being single, the appropriation of it by executing a partial release constituted
an appropriation of the entire cause or right to sue, not only as to the
alleged tortfeasors named in the release but also as to all other persons
who might properly be charged with the alleged wrongful death.
Apparently before the court for the first time was the question whether
a release of an employee's liability for tort operated to release the employer,
where the plaintiff's claim against the employer was based on the theory
of respondeat superior. In Max v. Spaetk,29 a car driven by the plaintiff
collided with a truck owned by the defendant and driven by his employee.
The employee had sued the plaintiff for negligence, but the suit was dis-
missed by a stipulation of dismissal which stated:
All of the matters and things in controversy in the above entitled
cause having been adjusted, compromised and finally settled, it is
hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between plaintiff and defend-
ant, that this cause shall be dismissed with prejudice to any other
or future action on account of the matters and things contained
and set forth in plaintiff's petition, and that court costs shall be
paid by defendant.3 0
The trial court entered judgment for the employer on his motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal by the plaintiff to the supreme court, it was
held that the settlement of the employee's tort action against the plaintiff,
in which plaintiff agreed without any qualification that "'all matters and
things in controversy' had been adjusted, 'compromised and finally settled,"'
operated to bar all rights plaintiff might have had to sue the defendant's
employee on any claim based on his negligence, and also released her claim,
based on the theory of respondeat superior, against the employer. Although
not citing any previous Missouri case involving similar facts, the court
29. 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961).
30. Id. at 2.
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observed that, "Certainly the same rule should apply when the question
of a servant's liability is finally determined by a release as when it is de-
termined by verdict."3 1
31. Id. at 3. Additional facts in the case showed that the plaintiff had also
filed suit against the defendant employer, who then had filed a counterclaim for
damages to his truck and an answer alleging contributory negligence. After plaintiff
had filed a reply to the counterclaim, a stipulation of dismissal was filed, which
stated:
All of the matters and things set forth in the defendant's counterclaim
having been adjusted, compromised and finally settled, it is hereby stipu-
lated and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant that defendant's
counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice to any other or future action
on account of the matters and things contained and set forth in said
counterclaim; that court costs shall abide the disposition of plaintiff's
cause of action and that plaintiff's cause of action shall remain on the
docket of pending causes in this Court, without prejudice.
rid. at 2. The court held that by filing the counterclaim and dismissing it the
defendant employer did not concede that the plaintiff had any meritorious claim
against him, and was not estopped from asserting the claim of release, even though
the stipulation for dismissal of his counterclaim stated that the plaintiff's cause of
action against the employer was to remain on the docket without prejudice.
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